Hume\u27s Account of Personal Identity by Pears, David
Philosophic Exchange
Volume 6
Number 1 Volume 6 (1975) Article 6
1975
Hume's Account of Personal Identity
David Pears
Oxford University
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons
@Brockport. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophic Exchange by
an authorized editor of Digital Commons @Brockport. For more
information, please contact kmyers@brockport.edu.
Repository Citation
Pears, David (1975) "Hume's Account of Personal Identity," Philosophic Exchange: Vol. 6 : No. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol6/iss1/6
DAVID PEARS 
Professor of Philosophy 
Oxford Uni'versity 
1
Pears: Hume's Account of Personal Identity
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1975
HUME'S ACCOUNT OF PERSON AL IDENTITY 
by 
David Pears 
Hume's account of personal identity is superior to most other accounts 
because it is more penetrating. It is given in two parts. First, there is the 
reductive theory set out in the main body of the Treatise, and then in the 
Appendix there is the recantation of that theory. Since the two parts cancel out, 
it is unrealistic to ask whether the whole account contains more truth, or less 
error, than other accounts. But we can assess it in another way. We can ask 
whether the trip was a good one, and whether we learned anything from the 
arguments which Hume uses, first against rival theories, and then against his 
own. When his discussion is assessed in this way, it should get high praise. It 
made a permanent difference to the subject. 
The theory offered in the body of the Treatise was intended to explain the 
fact that a person is a single unified being, persisting through time. It is a theory 
based on several axioms, and Hume builds it up on this basis very carefully and 
very scrupulously, never allowing himself to slip extra material into the structure, 
or extra assumptions. But in the end he finds that the theory does not fit the 
fact which it was designed to explain. So he is faced with a dilemma: either he 
must argue that the fact is not really what he had taken it to be, or else he must 
abandon the theory. He chose to abandon the theory, and he confessed that he 
was unable to find a better one to put in its place. 
That is a summary description of an investigation which is lengthy and com­
plex. I shall now go back to the starting-point and explain the axioms on which 
Hume based his supposedly unsuccessful theory. These may be divided into two 
groups. The first group is concerned with the conditions of perfect identity; and 
the second is concerned with the nature of the connection between the com­
ponents of a composite thing. 
The axioms in the first group are the following: 
(1) An incomposite thing enjoys perfect identity so long as it lasts. 
(2) A composite thing.enjoys perfect identity so long as there is no change in 
the identity of its incomposite components. 
(3) There is no third �ay of achieving perfect identity through time. 
Axiom (3) is directed against any third way that might be suggested. But the 
suggestion which Hume had chiefly in mind, and on which he spends a lot of 
argument, is the suggestion that a composite thing might achieve perfect identity 
through a constant substrate, 'Ibis substrate· would be a substance in one sense of 
that word, but not in the sense in which Hume allows that an incomposite thing 
would be a substance. That is a different use of the word. An incomposite thing 
would be a detectable substance, but a substrate would be an undetectable 
substance, and so, according to Hume, even if its nature were intelligible, its 
existence would be dubious. An incomposite thing is a kind of substance which 
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avoids these disadvantages, but has another disadvantage instead; it selfishly 
refuses to extend perfect identity to anything other than itself. 
Let us now look at the axioms in the other group, which is concerned with 
the nature of the connection between the components of a composite thing. I 
give these in Hume's words: 
( 4) "All our distinct perceptions are distinct existences. "1 
(5) "The mind never perceives any real connection among distinct ex­
istences.,,2 
These two axioms are stated for the special case in which the composite thing is 
a person's mind. But Hume really subscribes to generalised versions of them, 
which apply to composite material objects as well as to minds. 
The next thing is to ask how he proceeds to build up his supposedly un­
successful theory on the basis provided by these axioms. But before tackling 
that question I want to divide his discussion of personal identjty into two layers, 
in order to make it more manageable. On the surface there is 'his elaborate 
argument about identity, diversity and change, leading to the conclusion that 
persons do not enjoy perfect identity through time, Let me call this "the surface 
plot", meaning not that it is superficial or unimportant, but only that it is ex­
plicit. Beneath the surface plot, and largely hidden by it, there is what I shall call 
"the underplot". 
This division of Hume's discussion may be pictured as a horizontal line, 
whereas the other division that I mentioned, between the theory itself and the 
recantation of it. would be drawn as a vertical line. Above the horizontal line 
the surface plot is played out. The distinctive mark of the surface plot is that it 
treats persons like ordinary composite material objects. I do not mean that 
Hume treats persons as material objects. Far from it. After a few allusions to 
human bodies, he turns his back on them, and addresses himself to the narrower 
task of explaining the unity of human minds rather than human beings. What I 
mean is that, having restricted himself to human minds, he treats them like ordi­
nary material objects. E. g. when he asks whether the impr�ssions and ideas, 
which go to form a mind persisting through time, are organised in a way that 
confers perfect identity on that mind, he· construes this question like the 
question posed by William James in his discussion of this subject: Are the 
individual beasts in a herd of cattle persisting through time organised in a way 
that confers perfect identity on that herd?3 Both these questions get a negative 
answer based on Axioms (2) and (3), according to which, whenever there is any 
change in the identity of the components of a composite thing, physical or men­
tal, it loses its title to perfect identity through time. 
I am not yet in a position to give a detailed characterisation of the underplot. 
But what can be said in general is that it takes account of factors which are 
peculiar to persons and certain other animals, and perhaps some machines. This, 
of course is only a schema for describing the underplot, and different people will 
fill in the details in different ways. My way of filling them in will be based on 
Hume's text. I am interested only in those peculiarities of embodied minds 
which almost break the surface of his discussion of personal identity, but which 
do not quite succeed in breaking it. It would, of course, be possible to broaden 
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the scope of the inquiry, so as to bring in factors such as intentions and actions 
which lie entirely outside the drama as Hume presents it in Book I of the 
Treatise and in the Appendix. But I prefer to keep the inquiry more narrowly 
focussed on to those two texts, because I want to exhibit the tensions between 
his surface plot and his underplot. 
I shall not say much about the surface plot, because the general pattern of 
it is tolerably clear. U is important to notice that right from the start Hume 
turns his back on the human body, and concentrates on the unity of the human 
mind. He easily shows that a mind does not satisfy either of the two con­
ditions of perfect identity laid down in Axioms (1) and (2). Then he dismisses 
the third suggestion, that it might achieve perfect identity through a substrate. 
This is dismissed by an appeal to Axiom (3). Anyone who claims to have a 
distinct impression of his self as a separate entity is guilty of "a manifest contra­
diction and absurdity". 4 I take it that the absurdity that he means is the ab­
surdity of identifying an enduring substrate with any of the components which 
go to make up the composite thing whose substrate it is. At, least, that is how the 
absurdity is presented in the surface plot. Just as the substrate of a lump of rock 
cannot be identified with any of its physical components, so too the substrate of 
a mind cannot be identified with any of its mental components. 
But here I must interrupt the exposition of the surface plot in order to glance 
at the underplot. For the surface plot does not exhaust the richness of the 
absurdity which Hume is trying to expose. In the case of a material object, such 
as a table or chair, it is absurd to identify the suggested substrate with any 
detectable component. But in the case of a mind there is an extra dimP.nsion to 
the absurdity. That is, first, the· parallel absurdity of identifying the substrate 
with any detectable component of the mind, i.e. with any impression or idea. 
Then there is the additional complication that, if we did make such an identifi­
cation, the impression of the self would be an impression of another impression, 
and, therefore, in Hume's terminology, an impression of reflection. Now this 
complication is not enough, in itself, to lead to any further absurdity. For it 
would have been possible to argue, as William James did later, that consciousness 
simply consists in the fact that one component of the mind reflects another. 5 
But Hume's adversaries required the self to be a single subject, and such a subject 
could hardly get an impression of itself. James' theory that the subject is the 
passing thought, which apprehends earlier thoughts but not itself, avoids this 
absurdity, but only by abandoning the requirement of a single subject. Thus 
something which is simple enough in the surface plot carries richer implications 
in the underplot. 
Let me return to the surface plot. The next step in its development con­
cerns the relations between the mental components which go to form a single 
mind enduring through time. According to Hume, these relations are resem­
blance and causation. As demonstrated, they do not produce perfect identity, 
but they do produce the inferior substitute with which we have to rest content 
when we leave the philosopher's study. In other words, when Hume wrote the 
text of the Treatise, he believed that his theory of personal identity, founded on 
resemblance and causation, was an adequate theory, in spite of the fact that it 
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does not satisfy philosophers' dreams about perfect identity. He believed as we 
say nowadays, that his analysis of the concept of personal identity was correct. 
Since he had ceased to believe this by the time that he wrote the Appendix, 
it might be a good thing to mention two relations which have a strong claim to 
be included on his list, but which are not included on it. He does not include 
contiguity, in spite of the importance of temporal contiguity in the mental life 
of a person, and in spite of the fact that causation, which he does include, is said 
by him to involve contiguity. Another equally striking exclusion is the memory 
relation. 'Ibis is the relation which holds between a memory impression and the 
earlier mental component of which it is a memory impression. When I say that 
he excludes the memory relation from his list, I mean only that he does not treat 
this relation as part of the basis of personal identity. Naturally, he thinks that 
memory is indispensable, but only as a means of acquiring knowledge of one's 
own identity. For without memory, how could anyone discover that a series of 
mental items really were related by resemblance and causation, which, 
according to the theory, are the two basic relations? How could he even 
discover the existence of the mental items? But this does not make the memory 
relation into a third basic relation. It is true that he allows it a minor role in 
producing personal identity, as opposed to discovering it. Because he thinks that 
memory impressions are replicas, the memory relation multiplies resemblances 
and so helps to produce personal identity as a sort of side effect. But this work is 
done through resemblance, and resemblance is a basic relation already on the 
list, and so the memory relation does not acqujre a title to a place of its own on 
the list. 
It might be argued that Hume was right to refuse to put the memory 
relation on the list of relations that constitute personal identity. Perhaps 
memory does only discover personal identity. This is a difficult matter to settle, 
and the difficulty can be exhibited in the following way. Suppose that he had 
said that the memory relation also helps to produce personal identity by 
multiplying causal connections between mental items. This would have been a 
much more important point than his suggestion that it multiplies resemblances. 
As far as I know, he never says that memory helps to produce personal identity 
in this way. But if he had made this point, he could have argued very plausibly 
that it locates the most important thing that memory contributes to consti­
tuting personal identity. But would this give the memory relation a title to a 
place of its own on the list of basic relations? Probably not. For if he had made 
the point about memory and causality, be could still have defended his refusal to 
give the memory relation a place of its own on the list. Memory .would play its 
further role only through causation, which is already on the list. So perhaps his 
refusal to add the memory relation to the other two is not wrong, and the only 
fault in this part of his argument is that he does not offer a full justification of 
his refusal. 
What then is the denouement of the surface plot? If we do not include the 
Apper1:dix, the story ends with Hume's acceptance of a reductive theory. A 
human mind is composed of impressions and ideas related by resemblance and 
causality. He argues that there is no real alternative to this theory. Those who 
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say that a human mind enjoys a tidier type of identity have simply made a mis· 
take about the nature of the scale of better and worse types of identity. When 
we place various kinds of things on this scale, we are merely applying axioms 
(1), (2) and (3) to the empirical phenomena. If the result is that a physical atom 
exhibits perfect identity through time, while cabbages and kings do not, that is a 
final result, and there is no appeal beyond it. Of course, someone might chal· 
lenge Hume's account of the empirical phenomena, and claini that the identity 
of a physical atom, or of a cabbage, is not as he describes it. Or someone might 
make the more radical suggestion that we should not use the three axioms to 
define perfect identity; or even that we ought to give up talking about perfect 
identity altogether, because each kind of thing has its own appropriate criterion 
of identity, and there is no competition between them. But if we do construct 
the scale in the way sketched by Hume, and if we cannot find any mistake in 
his description of the empirical phenomena, then that result is final. It is a 
misunderstanding of the nature of the scale to bring in the unempirical concept 
"substrate", and to try to use it as the basis of a third type of perfect identity, 
which would be a sort of consolation prize for those who fail in the empirical 
competition. 
So Hume is satisfied with his reductive theory, and he has an explanation of 
his adversaries' dissatisfaction with it. His adversaries are obsessed with perfect 
identity, and try to find it where it does not exist. But when we follow the sur­
face plot into the Appendix, there is a dramatic change. All his satisfaction with 
bis theory vanishes. He still refuses to accept the suggestion that we have an un­
empirical concept of substance. But when he reviews his account of the connec-
' 
tions between the impressions and ideas of a single person, he finds il defective. 
Since philosophers' recantations are not too common, let me quote some of 
this one: "If perceptions (i.e. impressions and ideas) are distinct existences, 
they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connections among 
distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only feel a 
connection or determination of the thought to pass from one object to another. 
It follows, therefore, that the thought alone feels personal identity, when re­
flecting on the train of past perceptions that compose a mind; the ideas of them 
are felt to be connected together, and naturally introduce each other . . .  But all 
my hopes vanish when I come to explain the principles that unite our successive 
perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory which 
gives me satisfaction on this head."6 
This really is a recantation. It is not just a case of Hume's common flirting 
with his adversaries' feelings. His treatment of causal necessity contains several 
examples of this kind of insincerity-or, it may be, irony. I am thinking of the 
passages in which he expresses the fear that his reductive account of causal 
necessity may not only look too sceptical, but actually be too sceptical. But on 
the whole he is satisfied that that theory is adequate because it covers every­
thing that is empirically accessible. So his settled conclusion about that matter is 
that his adversaries are misled by the mind's "great propensity to spread itself on 
external objects, and to conjoin with them any internal impressions which they 
occasion. "7 
19 
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Why then, is he not equally satisfied with his reductive theory of personal 
identity? We may suspect that he is influenced by something in the underplot. 
For example, minds are self-reflexive, and so, though it may be a good explana­
tion of causal necessity to say that the mind i;preads itself on external objects, 
it does not sound so good an explanation of personal identity to say that it 
spreads itself on internal objects. However, Hume does not mention this 
difficulty at this point. Nor does he explicitly introduce any other motifs from 
the underplot. He sums up his reasons for rejecting his theory of personal iden­
tity in the following words: "In short, there are two principles which I cannot 
render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all 
our distinct perceptions are distinct existences; and that the mind never per­
ceives any real connection among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either 
inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real 
connection among them, there would be no difficulty in the case. For my part, 
I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess that this difficulty is too 
hard for my understanding. "8 
This is not irony. Hume was a subtle writer, capable of irony which often 
passes undetected. So it could have been irony. But it is not in fact irony, and 
the proof of this is that it is entirely different from his later reaction lo his 
reductive theory of causal necessity. In his Abstract of the Treatise he admits 
the sceptical character of that theory but claims that it is correct. 
Why, then, did he recant about personal identity'? In the remainder of this 
paper I shall go through the underplot trying to show that his real reasons for 
recanting are to be found there. But, naturally, I shall start from the reasons that 
he himself gives in the Appendix. 
The explicit reasons, given in the Appendix, belong to the surface plot. He 
does not say anything that is not also true of ordinary material objects, and his 
argument could equally well be applied to the identity of cabbages. This is a 
very striking fact. An even more striking feature of his recantation is that he 
sums it up by repeating Axioms (4) and (5) and saying that he cannot renounce 
either of them and yet that he is unable to render them consistent. Now Axioms 
(4) and (5) belong to the second group that I distinguished at the beginning of 
this paper. They are concerned with the nature of the connections between the 
components of composite things, and they stipulate that these connections are 
always contingent. What then can he mean when he says that he cannot render 
them consistent'? They do not even look inconsistent with one another. In fact, 
it would be plausible to argue that (5) merely gives the definition of the word 
"distinct" as it is used in ( 4). 9 If this is correct, Hume's point is that there are a 
priori connections between ideas, and associational connections between ideas 
produced, e.g. by constant conjunctions of impressions, but no third kind of 
connection called "real connection". 
I think that the solution to this problem of interpretation is that Hume means 
not that the two axioms are inconsistent with one another, but only that taken 
together they are inconsistent with the fact that a person is a single unified being 
persisting through time. In other words, he takes this fact to imply a greater 
degree of unity than the two axioms allow. If he had been prepared to revise his 
20 
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interpretation of the fact, he would not have had to recant. But he found himself 
unable to accept a more reductive interpretation of the fact, and so he recanted. 
As far as the text goes, this interpretation fits the whole tenor of the passage. 
Moreover, he never says that the two axioms are inconsistent with one another, 
but only that they are inconsistent. But I must admit that even this is an odd 
way of expressing the view that I am attributing to him, and possibly the ex­
planation is that the brevity of the Appendix has made it very inexplicit at 
this point. 
In any case, this interpretation will be convincing only if it can be explained 
why the lack of a real connection between the components of a mind left Hume 
dissatisfied. After all, the two axioms only require the connections to hold 
contingently. So if I have a taste impression followed by a memory idea of Paris, 
it will only be a contingent fact that the second followed the first. But what is 
wrong with that? He can hardly have supposed that such a connection ought to 
be non-contingent. Admittedly, in this example the connection happens to be 
causal, but then his main thesis about causal connections is that they only 
hold contingently. In any case, non-causal examples could easily be found. 
It seems that the only way to answer this objection and to give an intelligible 
reconstruction of his reasoning is to draw on the underplot. Minds differ from 
ordinary composite material objects in more than one way, and it is likely 
that some of those differences will provide clues to his line of thought. 
For example, the ownership of impressions and ideas has several well-known 
peculiarities. If I have a sense impression, there is no room for any question 
about its owner-the owner must be myself. Nor can I speculate that the sense 
impression might have been yours instead of mine, or that it might have existed 
on its own, not belonging to anybody. Such speculations lack sense. Now these 
peculiarities of the ownership of mental objects have to be accommodated in 
any viable theory of personal identity. But how was Hume to accommodate 
them in his theory'? How was he to weave these threads from the underplot 
into a surface plot whose dominant pattern was set by the analogy between 
mental objects and ordinary material objects? 
One would expect that there would be some distortion at this point, and in 
fact there is. Instead of saying that, if I have an impression, it must be mine, 
could not have belonged to anyone else, and could not have existed on its own, 
he wants to be able to say that, if I have an impression, it could not have failed 
to occur in the series that is myself. But that would not be the same thing. I 
think that it seemed to him to be the same thing because he pushed the analogy 
between mental objects and material objects too far. If a cow belongs to a 
particular herd, it need not have belonged to it, and it-the very same cow­
might have belonged to a different herd, or even lived on its own. This may 
have suggested to him that, if he had allowed that a certain sense impression 
which occurs in the series that is myself might not have done so, then he would 
have been forced to allow that it-the very same sense impression-might have 
occurred in a series that is someone else, or even existed on its own. In fact no 
such concession would have been forced from him. He could have pointed out 
that there is a limit to the analogy between mental objects and material objects. 
21 
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But because he failed to see the limit, he thought that the only way to accom­
modate the peculiar features of the ownership of mental objects would be to 
say that, when a series contains a particular mental object, it could not have 
failed to contain it. In short, he confused the following two modal propositions: 
(i) This series might not have incJuded S. 
(ii) S might have occurred outside this series. 
The thesis, that Hume is here exaggerating the analogy between mental 
objects and material objects, must not be taken to imply that all types of 
material object have criteria which make their numerical identities independent 
of the numerical identities of material objects of any other type. That is not so . 
.Although most types of material object are not identity-dependent in this way, 
some types are. For example, a particular brick is not dependent for its identity 
on the wall in which it has been incorporated, and it could have been incor­
porated in a different wall. But suppose that I point to the branch of a tree, and 
say that it-the very same branch-might have grown on a different tree. Here we 
have a material example of identity-dependence, and my speculation would lack 
sense. All that I can imagine is that another tree might have grown a branch 
exactly like this one, and that, at the same time, this tree might not have grown 
this one. So this kind of identity-dependence is not confined to mental objects. 
However, it does seem to extend to all types of mental object, and it is, 
perhaps, especially puzzling in this area. Its puzzling character may be brought 
out through a contrast between a branch of a tree and a sense impression. An 
explanation of the identity-dependence of a branch would go something like 
this. In the case of a branch we could always adopt a new criterion, according to 
which its numerical identity would be tied to the matter out of which it is 
formed. Then the speculation that lacked a sense could immediately be given 
one. It would mean that that matter might have been absorbed by a different 
tree, and might have grown out of it in the form of a similar branch. Of course, 
someone might object that this would still not be a case of the very same branch 
growing on a different tree, because he might persist in treating the numerical 
identity of the tree as a necessary condition of the numerical identity of the 
branch. But there would be no mystery about this. We would have three dis­
cernible things to juggle with, the matter of the branch. its form, and its 
relation to a particular tree. These three things could be used in various ways to 
produce alternative criteria of numerical identity for branches. The relation to a 
particular tree is only one thing, and it is easy to see what is going on when some­
one refuses to allow the numerical identity of a branch to be independent of 
this relation. 
But the whole affair is more mysterious in the case of a sense impression. 
For though two of the things are used in this case-the form (or quality) of the 
sense impression and its relation to a particular person-the third thing-its 
matter-is not used. Consequently, we do not have such a clear idea of what we 
would have to do in order to give a sense to the senseless speculation. Would we 
merely collapse the concept of the numerical identity of a sense impression into 
exact similarity? Or would we have to wait until we were in a position to base a 
new criterion of numerical identity on the matter of the nervous system? 
22 
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To return to Hume-it may seem hard to believe that he could have exaggera­
ted the similarity between sense impressions and material objects, such as 
bricks, to quite such an extent. For the facts about the ownership of mental 
objects are familiar, and so they might seem to be le� malleable than this. But 
half thought out analogies are very powerful in philosophy, and there is ample 
evidence in the Treatise for this account of what was going on in his mind. For 
example, in the chapter on the Immateriality of the Soul, he says: " . . .  since 
all our perceptions are different from each other, and from everything else in 
the universe, they are also distinct and separable, and may be considered as 
separately existent, and may exist separately, and have no need of anything 
else to support their existence. 'They are, therefore, substances, as far as this 
definition explains substance" .10 This is not an isolated passage, and it marks 
out a line of thought which Hume was prepared to follow in the text of the 
Treatise, but not in the Appendix. The analogy with bricks, or perhaps with 
physical atoms, is being openly pushed to the extreme. In this way sense 
impressions seem to acquire a degree of independence which makes it impossible 
to explain the fact that one of mine could not have been one of yours. 
This strange way of treating mental objects is connected with his account of 
the way in which memory helps a person to answer a question about his own 
earlier identity. He says that memory discovers, but does not constitute, personal 
identity, except in so far as it multiplies resemblances between a person's mental 
objects. This suggests that my memory puts me in touch with a number of 
mental objects, about which I then ask whether they belong to the series that 
terminates on myself at the presept moment, and that I am supposed to answer 
this question by applying the criteria of resemblance and causation. But this 
description of my procedure presupposes that memory is an impersonal way of 
collecting data, which are then examined and assigned to myself or some other 
person. Did Hume then deliberately use "memory " to signify a faculty which 
puts me in direct touch with earlier mental objects that belong to any person, 
myself or another? Apparently not. For there is no evidence to support the 
view that in his discussion of personal identity he is intentionally presupposing 
a predicament that is not ours. Of course, he allows for errors of memory, but 
not for what Shoemaker calls "quasi-memory".11 On the other hand, in this 
discussion he does not even mention any of the ordinary ways in which we 
discover the objects in other people's minds. So there really is an unintentional 
presupposition that memory is an impersonal way of collecting data. How 
should we interpret it? 
. It should probably be connected not with any carefully thought out theory 
about the way that the data are, or might be acquired, but, rather, with his 
general picture of the world of mental objects. When he pushed the analogy 
between mental and material objects too far, it was natural for him to write as 
if we could establish the existence of mental objects without prejudice to the 
question of their ownership, as can be done with cattle. Then, if he retained his 
uncritical assumption that memory is the only source of the relevant data, it 
would be assigned a role which it could not possibly perform. For how could I 
rely on my memory for the existence of an earlier mental object, while re-
23 10
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jecting the inference that it was mine? 
Only too easily, it might be retorted, if the concept of memory is changed. 
But since there is no evidence that Hurne was deliberately changing the concept 
in the required way, it is more likely that he slipped into the impersonal treat­
ment of memory because he exaggerated the analogy between mental and 
material objects without fully realising the consequences. 
So much for the second of the two possibilities whose unrealisability he 
laments in the Appendix: "did the mind perceive some real connection among 
them [our perceptions] . . .  ". The first one still remains to be considered: "did 
our perceptions . . .  inhere in something simple and individual . . .  ". Why did he 
say that, if this possibility were realised, "there would be no difficulty in the 
case"? What made him wish that he had been able to accept this kind of theory? 
This question is unlikely to be answerable in as straight-forward a way as the 
question about his other wish. The theory that a mind is "something simple and 
individual" is such a panacea that the wish that it were an acceptable theory is 
likely to be overdetermined. Nevertheless it is surprising to find how very 
general Hume's stated reasons are. The considerations that he adduces apply not 
only to minds but also to composite material things. According to him, the only 
kind of identity enjoyed by all these composite things is the inferior, fictional 
kind. But if the problem is so widespread, why does he confess his inability to 
solve it only in the case or minds? Here too there must be something at work in 
the underplot. Bu� what? 
There are two things that may have been working in his mind at this point. 
He may have felt that, if he could not show that the impressions and ideas of a 
person were presented to a single thing, consciousness would remain un­
explained. Or, alternately, he may have felt that, if he could not show that a 
mind is a simple continuant, he could not give an adequate account of the way in 
which it acquires and retains knowledge of the world in which it is placed. The 
first of these two problems is concerned with the phenomenology of what 
happens within a mind, while the second is concerned with its mechanism and 
its place in nature. Unfortunately, Hume does not say which of the two problems 
was exercising him. He gives clear reasons for rejecting the theory that the mind 
is "something simple and individual ". If he had identified the self with any 
detectable component of a mind, the impression of the self would have been an 
impression of  that component, and, therefore, an impression of reflection. But 
it is absurd to identify a composite thing with any of its components, and a 
single subject could hardly get an impression of itself in that way. Why, then, 
did he find this theory so attractive? He does not tell us, and the choice 
between the two interpretations must be based on indirect evidence. 
The prevalent interpretation is the first one, which claims that he was hoping 
to find a way of explaining the phenomenon of consciousness. But there is 
strong circumstantial evidence against this interpretation. He never shows any 
sign of thinking that he needs to point to a single subject in order to explain 
consciousness. He took it for granted that one component of a mind can re­
flect another, and apparently did not feel that impressions of reflection posed 
any problem. He alJowed himself to make use of intentionality without trying 
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to explain it, and he felt no doubts about its range because he· treated impres­
sions of memory as unproblematic. In short, he did not see that there might be 
difficulties about the synthetic unity of consciousness, and his course appeared 
to be set towards the kind of theory that was later developed by William James. 
In fact, he did not go so far as to identify the self with the passing thought. But 
without violating the principles of his empiricism, he cou!d have explained the 
idea of the self as an idea of an expanding series of mental components. These 
components would be identified through their positions in the series, and i f  a 
number of them were all tokens of the same type-idea, their contents would be 
identical. But the content of the idea of the self would increase as the series 
expanded. No doubt this is a complicated theory, but at no point does Hume 
show any signs of being troubled by the general problem of consciousness or by 
the special problem of reflexivity. 
His difficulty seems to begin when he has to explain how a mind acquires and 
retains any knowledge of the world and of its place in it. For how can he explain 
the working of memory in his system? If I wonder whether· a man sitting 
opposite me in a train is the one who sat opposite me yesterday, I wol,lld take 
my own identity for granted. But if he questioned whether I was the man who 
had occupied the same seat on yesterday's journey, I would have to verify my 
daim that I was, perhaps by producing memory impressions which could be 
checked. Similarly, the identity of a star could be established through a photo­
graph taken by a rocket-borne camera, or the identity of th.e camera could be 
established through the images on its film. In both cases it ils necessary that we 
should be able to argue either frpm the identity of the recorder to the identity 
of what it records, or in the reverse direction. This evidently requires that there 
should be general agreement between the record and the recorder's independent­
ly established history. But how could memory meet this requirement in Hume's 
system? 
That depends on how liberally his system is constructed. He occasionally 
speculates about the physical basis of the mind, and, if he had allowed himself 
to use that kind of material in his discussion of personal identity, he might have 
given an adequate account of memory. But in fact he does not use it, and the 
implication is that he can solve the problem entirely from the resources o f  the 
mind. This restriction puts memory in an impossible position. Just as I, body 
and mind, am related to the two appearances of the man in the train, so too I, 
the remembering subject, ought to be related to any sense impressions that occur 
in my mind. But this will not work. For in the train there are independent ways 
of checking my identity, but there are no independent ways of checking the 
identity of the remembering subject in Hume's restricted system. His wish that 
the subject were single is merely the wish that this did not matter. Another 
reason why the analogy does not work is that there is no material left over for 
incorporation in an account of the causal mechanism of the remembering 
subject. His wish that the subject were simple is merely the wish that this too 
did not matter. However, it does matter that his picture of the mind impels him 
towards a theory which makes the identity of the subject independent of any 
checks and its operation independent of any mechanism. He knows that such a 
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theory is a philosopher's dream, but he does not retrace his steps in order to find 
out which of them led him into the impasse. 
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